How to win an election when the chips are down. From GOP playbook.

Own the media (done)

2. Own the voting machines (done)

3. Purposely bias polls, and use the media to convince people that the vote is legitimate. (done)

4. When things are really looking bad resort to “Plan B”.

    Bad is defined as:

  • The general populace has really had enough of your bullshit
  • Democrats have finally caught on that you actually have rigged the voting machines

Plan B:

1. Announce far ahead of time that the voting machines are rigged, and if you lose, it is because the democrats have rigged the vote. Say this a lot (with the help of the media), so it appears that the democrats are in control of the voting machines. (in process)

2. Just before the elections, heighten the terror alert, or drag out some scapegoat of a plot to put in the news.

3. Rig the election as usual, and the media pundits will rationalize for you how security concerns changed voter choices in the final days (the best part is the pundits will be unwitting participants, they don’t even need to know the real truth)

4. The democrats will not be able to claim the vote was rigged, because it now appears that if anyone could rig the vote, it was the democrats (see step 1 of Plan B)

How do we “defuse” Plan B? The democrats need to start speaking up now, and loudly about who owns the voting machine companies, and the linkages to the GOP.

Posted on Democratic Underground by Pobeka

1 Star2 Stars3 Stars4 Stars5 Stars (No Ratings Yet)

One Response to “How to win an election when the chips are down. From GOP playbook.”

  1. David A. Dean Says:

    I’m suggesting the following procedure as a way to prevent, detect and correct voter fraud. Nobody has yet pointed out a serious flaw. Please provide it to anyone that you think might benefit from it or be able to improve or implement it. I’d very much appreciate receiving feedback and suggestions. David A. Dean,

       According to this plan, every voter in any election or poll would manually select a packet from a mixture of similar packets. Each packet would contain a ballot plus a card, with both ballot and card displaying the same unique identification number plus information identifying the election, date and polling place. Neither the ballot nor card would contain any personal information that could be used to identify the voter. A single packet would be selected manually by the voter from a group of packets immediately before entering the empty voting booth, so that nobody but the voter would ever know the voter’s number. After voting, by hand scoring, the ballot would be placed by the voter in a box, with other ballots, just outside the booth. (It can be debated whether or not the ballot and public record should contain other generic information such as age, sex or affiliations so that politicians and the world can know and be responsive to the categories of people that vote.) No information would leave the booth electronically. The votes and other information could be recorded at the local polling station during voting, but not yet made public. Immediately after (but not before) the polls close everywhere, the votes plus unique voter numbers (and possibly age, sex, etc. data) would be permanently posted on the internet, throughout the world (except where censored), along with instant tallies and numerical analyses. From that time on, voters, alone or with the help of trusted friends, family or volunteers with internet access, could detect and correct fraudulent or accidental errors in their votes and other information. If someone else tried to change a vote, that could be reported and verified locally by the card carrier.) Also, from that time forward, anyone in the world with internet access (and not censored locally) would be able to check on the results, compare original and modified versions (which would quickly reveal patterns of fraud), read official analysis, and read and contribute to public analyses. Lack of universal internet access is unlikely to be a major problem: Voters without access would be much better served by indirect access through volunteer services (available via toll-free telephone) or trusted family and friends than by unverifiable official sources. (Anyone who correctly reads your internet record back to you must be telling the truth.) Also, mass media print and broadcast coverage and verification, both local and international, would presumably be much more reliable and complete when backed up by instant, hands-off, verifiable election data and voter feedback. This process should provide unprecedented power to voters, and therefore to honest politicians. The instant and universal collation and analysis of information would presumably be accomplished too fast for anyone to control the impact. Attempts to discredit the process would fail and possibly backfire because of its transparency and grassroots verification. Widespread adoption of such a system would reward participating governments and pressure non-participating ones to change. NOTE: Although some details of the above scheme would probably need to be modified for practical reasons, its success would depend upon preservation of the key features: completely anonymous voting; immediate, permanent and universal internet display of original and modified voting records and analyses; direct and anonymous correction of recording mistakes by voters; and recourse to voter identification by personal card display in cases of felonious changes in the voting record.

       Although this system would not directly prevent attempts to prevent a person from voting, it would protect the voter’s privacy and therefore access to all information about the voter’s past and present voting preferences. This is an important advantage of this system. Voters would be registered to vote but would not be identified at the polling station or linked to his or her voting record then or at any time in the future.

Leave a Reply

Comments are gravatar enabled.

You must be logged in to post a comment.